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Naming Horror: Legal and Political Words
for Mass Atrocities
Martha Minow
Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School

We live at a time when journalists coin phrases like ‘‘compassion fatigue’’ to describe
failures of ordinary outrage and human action against massive killings, famines, and
plagues. Our is a time when mass media and the Internet offer unprecedented
connections among people—and when the top ‘‘hits’’ for Internet searches of ‘‘atrocity’’
and ‘‘nameless crime’’ each produce the Web sites of rock bands,1 even as the ongoing
and vicious brutalities in the Darfur region of the Sudan escalate and Rwanda,
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and still other regions stagger to recover from the legacies of
their own mass atrocities. Other nations participate in the creation and operation of ad
hoc and long-term international criminal institutions, and at times use the United
Nations’ cumbersome mechanisms to name and even condemn mass violence, but fail
to provide swift and effective action to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities.
In this context, one can only welcome David Scheffer’s thoughtful and practical
call to separate the political and legal uses of ‘‘genocide’’ and to devise the broader
category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ for public communication about genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Scheffer’s essay represents the kind of scholarship on vital
international affairs that is most needed. Every page reveals both his on-the-ground
experience as US ambassador-at-large for war crimes and US representative to the
United Nations and his analytic care. His report of barriers to effective action in
response to recent experiences of genocide and mass violence is compelling and
distressing. He identifies four problems: first, the legal requirements for establishing
what is a genocide are stringent and cumbersome and contribute to delays in
international responses; second, the absence of a well-developed idea of stages prior to
but leading to genocide similarly contributes to delays in international responses;
third, the reliance on legal terms in political discourse confuses the demands of each
realm; and, fourth, there is no easy public term for the collection of horrors that
lawyers name ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and harms of comparable
seriousness and massiveness. Therefore, Scheffer recommends the development of new
terms, including ‘‘precursors of genocide’’ and ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
The frustration behind Scheffer’s effort is palpable and telling, and the failures of
national and international response deserve much more serious attention than they
have received.2 But the problems he addresses will not be cured by new words. It is a
matter of some interest that a person of Scheffer’s wisdom and expertise should put his
emphasis in that direction. That choice in itself deserves some discussion, but the
necessary energy would be better spent pursuing better leadership, better media and
educational efforts to mobilize sustained public responsiveness, and the development
of a richer spectrum of available responses to join national and international efforts to
halt mass and dehumanizing violence. I will try to elaborate through three comments.
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First, as attractive as ‘‘naming’’ may seem for changing perceptions
and behavior, renaming legal categories will do little to address
underlying problems of leadership and will
Satisfying legal criteria for genocide for purposes of prosecution is difficult. Diplomats
thinking of launching interventions can get caught up in anticipating the legal
difficulties while something that appears to be a genocide unfolds. But attributing
delays and reluctance to mount national and international responses seems a mistake,
given the more obvious sources of reluctance in apathy, fear, self-interest, and
perceived futility on the parts of national leaders and their constituents. Blaming the
legal categories here is like blaming the legal categories of tort law for the national and
international failures to deal with global warming. The cure will not come from new
words. Instead, we need better leadership and a spectrum of responses to join national
and international efforts to halt mass and dehumanizing violence.
Scheffer perceptively describes the laborious process of defining a particular
atrocity as a genocide3 and attributes the tardiness of national and international
response to this difficulty. He cites the example of Darfur, with eighteen months
passing before the US government named the mass killings and ethnic cleansing in
that region a genocide. Yet, as Scheffer himself states, the obstacles to mobilizing a
national or international response did not disappear, and, in fact, seemed to increase,
after the American determination of genocide. The hopes of advocates that the name
‘‘genocide’’ would propel the United States to act were dashed. The explanation for this
seems to be that the very label implied such an enormous evil that the United States
would have had to be ready to commit as many troops, as much money, and as many
diplomatic resources as might be necessary to stop it—with no assurances as to when
or how such intervention would succeed.
Fears that responding to mass violence will require too much sacrifice, at too high
a cost, or with little assurance of efficacy, explain the failures of response more
persuasively than confusion over whether the events underway deserve the label
‘‘genocide’’ or that of ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’4 Even if labeling were the issue,
‘‘crimes against humanity’’ is already a label that calls for serious response. Indeed, in
its reference to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and persecution, the
definition of crimes against humanity overlaps with the definition of genocide and
surely crosses whatever threshold people may need to indicate horrors of the most
severe order.
The focus on names is understandable, but it is too limited to meet the underlying
concerns. In particular, new names will not undo the reluctance of individuals,
nations, and international organizations to respond to mass violence; this reluctance
has many sources, but no small contribution comes from fear about what is required
for a full and effective response.
Now, why should Scheffer focus on words? It could be that the development of
‘‘genocide’’ as a category—and the story of Raphael Lemkin’s one-person campaign—is
so inspiring that a new campaign, with new words, seems promising.5 Indeed,
Lemkin’s is a heroic tale, and nongovernmental groups as well as UN agencies and
nation-states can now engage in different kinds of debates because there is now a
category for the intentional effort to eliminate an entire group of people. Lemkin
rightly identified first the mass killings of Armenians and then the Holocaust as
atrocities of a specific nature—plans to destroy a whole people—that had no prior
label; that is not the difficulty today, in part because the international community then
developed the notions of genocide and crimes against humanity. In addition, we now
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have the object lesson of our experience with the invention of the legal category of
genocide. That word generated a convention and diplomatic activities, but its existence
has not halted the numbers or rate of horrors that fit under its definition. There is no
evidence from this instance that a word alone will make the difference in mobilizing
action. And unless words alone make the difference, there is no reason to believe that a
new phrase would not fall victim to the same dynamic—a sense of enormous stakes
met with reluctance to interfere in another nation’s activities, reluctance to go down
the road that leads to military action.
Perhaps Scheffer means to tap into the sense of urgency and condemnation that
comes when a collection of events in the world becomes understood as violating
fundamental human rights. Something in this direction may have happened when the
international criminal tribunals began to acknowledge mass rapes as evidence
of genocide.6 In a different context, the legal terms ‘‘sexual harassment’’ and
‘‘environmental racism’’ have provided legal and practical avenues for addressing
harms that people had experienced but that had not been condemned through public
institutions.7 Those of us who have chosen legal careers hope that law can mobilize
action and produce change. But the hammer of legal categories does not make
everything a nail. Our own specific professional expertise may, in fact, be a very
limited contribution to addressing massive problems. Work on political mobilization,
more thoughtful media messages that reduce the risk of ‘‘compassion fatigue,’’ analysis
of strategic political interests capacious enough to include reputation and humanrights values, and the development of a range of sanctions and other tools are among
the directions that seem more likely to reach the roots of the failures of nations to act
in response to mass atrocity.
The risk of overemphasizing lawyers’ categories as solutions should not obscure
the degree to which existing law actually can, with the right leadership, accomplish
a fair amount of what Scheffer wants. For example, the new phrase ‘‘precursors to
genocide’’ is meant to fill a gap and to trigger earlier recognition of actions giving rise
to a genocide, before large numbers of killings have occurred. Yet even without that
phrase, the current legal framework already recognizes, condemns, and authorizes
prosecution and punishment for steps on the way to genocide: article 3 of the UNCG
criminalizes
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
These terms may not fully communicate to political leaders and ordinary citizens
the warning signals of severe violations of human rights, however, and communication
along these lines may be what Scheffer means to prompt by devising the concept of
‘‘precursors to genocide.’’ Similarly, it would help if states could generate more options
than verbal condemnation, economic sanctions, and military action in order to meet early
warning signals of potential genocides with proportionate and meaningful responses.

Second, for public communication, the term ‘‘atrocity crime’’ loses the
specificity of ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ without
offering clarity in return
For ease of communication, I certainly understand Scheffer’s reasons for proposing a
general category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to group together what currently get the labels
39
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‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ and ‘‘war crimes.’’ Yet despite his hope to break
free from legalistic definitions, I find myself wondering about the exact referents for
‘‘atrocity crimes.’’ Would the phrase simply scoop up all acts currently covered by
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes? Only some of them? Or more than
them? Some of the confusion comes from the fact that the term ‘‘atrocity’’ is already in
use: in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s definition of ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’8
in definitions of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,9 and in at least one
nation’s effort to define universal jurisdiction.10
Even in writing this short commentary, I have struggled to find words to describe
the topic of concern and have at times used ‘‘atrocity,’’ ‘‘massive killings,’’ and ‘‘massive
violence.’’ None of the terms is adequate. Using ‘‘genocide,’’ however, taps into the
hard-won arguments about the truly heinous nature of orchestrated efforts to destroy
a people. ‘‘Crimes against humanity’’ has the benefit of underscoring that the interests
of all of humanity are at stake and also the unacceptability of denying the humanity of
victims.11 A general term would be useful to identify the range of these offenses, plus
war crimes, and ‘‘atrocity’’ may be as good as any; but perhaps the very awkwardness
of locution should remain—as a partial acknowledgment of the incommensurability of
human language and responses to the horrors at hand.12

Third, doing something to get people to think and act is crucial
I endorse entirely Scheffer’s effort to stand back from particular conflicts to consider
what national and global initiatives could lift us from the dismal patterns that join
heinous violence with tardy and insufficient international responses. Even if others
join me in criticizing his particular proposals, he has accomplished no small part of his
goal if he gets people to engage with the difficulties. The debate makes me think we
need to spend more time understanding the sources of resistance—by individuals, by
nations, by international organizations—if we are to devise more meaningful and
timely responses to mass atrocities.
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